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Abstract. This paper explores some issues concerning the ontology of photography. 
It would appear that photography’s ontology bears some significant specificities com-
paring with other art forms. First, the study of negative film and printed photograph 
relations shows us that photography has a multi-layered ontology, since although the 
latter is ontologically dependent upon the former, it stands autonomously as work of 
art. Second, I will consider the problem of forgery in photography. It seems that pho-
tographs are autographic and allographic, fakeable and unfakeable. Third, ontological 
status of negative film will be explored. Apparently, current ontological categories aren’t 
pertinent as far as negative-photograph’s ontology is concerned. That’s why, relying on 
Gérard Genette ontological notions, I propose to consider the negative film as «imma-
nence» and the printed photograph as work’s «transcendence». In this regard, printed 
photograph functions as a manifestation of the negative film.
Keywords. Ontology, photography, negative film, printed photograph. 
1. INTRODUCTION
As Guy Rohrbaugh points out «we surely live in a golden age 
for the ontology of art» (Rohrbaugh [2012]: 29). In spite of several 
scholarly reflections on the subject during last decades, as Thomas-
son indicates, the ontology of art is «a difficult philosophical prob-
lem» (Thomasson [2004]: 83). This problem aggravates when it 
comes to the ontology of photography. I will argue that this onto-
logical complication is due to medium specificities of photography, 
which are to some degree similar to music (traditionally scored 
works of classical music) and visual arts like etching. That’s why 
we need to introduce a particular ontology for photography which 
could describe the possible modes of existence peculiar to this medi-
um. Issues that I examine here are certainly debatable and I owe a 
considerable part of my suggestions to preceding efforts to explain 
the ontological status of artworks.
There are few studies devoted to the ontology of photography. 
Without intending to go into the details of this absence, the ontol-
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ogy of photography has not yet been completely 
absent in contemporary studies (see: Rohrbaugh 
[2003]; Mag Uidhir [2012]; Soulages [2005]1; 
and Benovsky [2010]2). The pioneering text of 
André Bazin placed in opening of his Qu’est-ce 
que le cinéma ? (1958) is possibly the first study 
devoted to this subject. Nevertheless, Bazin’s 
reflections rely upon phenomenological perspec-
tive that may appear today far removed from the 
current debates of ontology as it is discussed in 
analytic aesthetics. The question which arises 
above all is to know what the ontological modali-
ties of a photograph are. To put it another way, 
what sort of thing is a photograph? And, more 
particularly, how a printed photograph is relat-
ed to its negative/raw file? I will try to propose 
ontology of the photographic image by compar-
ing it with the ontology of the other art forms. 
We would see that the ontology of photography 
1 Although the reflections of Soulages does not conceive 
an ontology in the strict sense, they relate to the «mode 
of being» of a photograph through the necessary processes 
of realization of a photographic work. Soulages introduces 
in this regard two ontological levels: irreversibility and the 
unachievable. The first level relates to the irreversibility 
of the photographic act. Thus, once the film is exposed 
it is impossible to change or rework it. At this level, each 
photo is ontologically unique and irreplaceable, a fixa-
tion of reality seen photographically. The second level 
relates to what Soulages calls «the work of the negative» 
and consists of obtaining a photograph through technical 
steps of printing in the laboratory. Thus from the same 
negative the work of the negative is unachievable, insofar 
as it can always be reworked and accomplished again in 
a potentially different way (Soulage [2005]: 115). He con-
cludes that the origin of the value of the photograph lies 
primarily in this temporal irreversibility, because the pho-
to retains the photographed at the cost of losing every-
thing else: «The photographicity is this amazing articula-
tion of the irreversible (l’irréversible) and the unachievable 
(l’inachevable)» (Soulage [2005]: 115).
2 In an interesting debate Benovsky refutes the thesis that 
photography is among the universals. In what may be 
called the «metaphysics of photography» Benovsky shows 
that photography is not placed in the category of (Platon-
ist) non-spatio-temporal universals nor in that of (imma-
nent) space-time universals (Benovsky [2010]: 52). He 
concludes that photography is a «bizarre» entity (58).
has specificities that are not found as such in the 
other arts.
In the following sections, I limit my arguments 
only to the analogue photography as it is prac-
ticed through exposure of negative film, develop-
ing process, and printing the image on the pho-
tographic paper. Assuming though that digital 
photography proceeds often according to the same 
steps, except that the negative film is replaced by 
pixels and developing process is substituted by 
photo editing practices. The result could be print-
ed or displayed on screens. Furthermore, here I 
maintain a nominalist standpoint. If «nominalism 
is the doctrine that there are no abstract entities» 
(Field [1980]: 1), then there is no abstract entities 
such as photography. All that exists are individu-
al concrete photographs that are created and can 
come into and go out of existence.
Which are the ontological relations between 
negative and printed photograph? Which kind of 
thing is a photographic negative? Could it be com-
pared with musical score? The act of projecting 
the negative onto the paper with a photographic 
enlarger should be considered as an instantiation, 
an interpretation or a definite causal relation that 
takes place when the negative becomes a positive 
printed photograph? Is it justified to consider the 
negative as a photographic work before printing 
it? These are the main questions of this paper.
To begin, it is important to keep in mind that 
photographs (at least in analogue photography) are 
not created through a single operation. Since from 
film exposure to the printed photograph there are 
several steps that each one could possibly modify 
the ontological properties of the final result. For 
instance, photo manipulation (retouching) occur 
during the transposition of a negative image to a 
printed photograph (either directly on negative film 
or through negative’s projection on paper). These 
manipulations not only produce ontological modi-
fications but also could sometimes count as aes-
thetically valuable. Therefore, the interdependence 
of the aesthetic and the ontological is an essential 
issue as far as photography as fine art is concerned.
The question is whether the negative is ontologi-
cally more important than printed photograph. If 
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former is the case, why so much scrupulous atten-
tion to the quality of prints by photographers? If the 
latter, why so much attention to the preservation of 
negatives by photographers, curators, and archivists? 
Why the negatives are handled and stored with spe-
cial care, while once the printing process is finished 
and the perfect photographs are achieved, they are 
almost abandoned in archive? Furthermore, work of 
photography – as it is exposed in galleries or saled 
in outbiddings – is always a printed photograph. It 
is surely counterintuitive if, for example, Andreas 
Gursky puts one of his negative/raw files on the art 
market. As if one goes to the record shop in order to 
buy the score of Mozart’s 40th symphony! The nega-
tive as well as the score are only «potential» work of 
art and must be actualised to be available for public. 
Thus to see «an image on the negative is a bit like 
seeing the sketch of a painting that is not yet com-
plete» (Benovsky [2010]: 47).
2. THE PROBLEM OF «NOTATIONALITY»
Analogically, the negative film plays the role of 
the score or drama, that is to say there exists the 
work and realization of a work. Is this analogy 
all illuminating in order to understand the ontol-
ogy of the photographic image? I suppose not. On 
the one hand, even if the score requires an acous-
tic realization to become the musical work, the 
interpretation of the score must conform to the 
norms and requirements defined and specified by 
the composer. Although a so-called free interpre-
tation is possible, there is a correct interpretation 
of a score, this correctness finally determines the 
success of the interpreter and its scrupulous «fidel-
ity» to the musical structure of the score (hence 
the slogan «nothing can replace the score»). The 
same is the case in the staging of a drama. Never-
theless, the problem begins where the photograph-
ic film often carries no prescriptions determining 
the process of the printing of a photograph. To 
speak like Goodman, the printing of a photograph 
is not «notational»3 because photography does not 
3 According to Goodman «a system is notational, then, 
if and only if all objects complying with inscriptions of a 
benefit a notational system. There is a standard 
notation in music that determines the quality and 
accuracy of performance, «since complete compli-
ance with the score is the only requirement for a 
genuine instance of a work» (Goodman [1968]: 
186). Accordingly, provided instructions by com-
poser must necessarily be followed by those aware 
of the relevant conventions and practices to per-
form a strict instance of the work. Not having 
access to such instructions about a given negative, 
we cannot generalize this procedure to photog-
raphy. Reasoning in this way, there would be no, 
then, a strict instance of a given negative.
In addition, the score and the manuscript can 
alter even after the end of creation. For example, 
musicians may find unplayable a measure of a giv-
en score because of a notational error or because 
of acoustic incapabilities of an instrument. In lit-
erary text, it often happens that one can not read 
a word or a sentence on a given manuscript or 
one can find inexplicable syntactic errors in it. In 
these cases, it is possible to «correct» these dis-
orders in order to ensure the aesthetic coherence 
of the work. In the case of photography, though, 
there is no a prototype compare to which one can 
remove disorders of the work. Once the nega-
tive is exposed and developed, the visual struc-
ture is fixed forever. Thus, it seems that literary 
and musical works possess a syntactically flexible 
structure, which is therefore correctable, whereas 
the negative film is a syntactically inflexible and 
therefore incorrigible structure. This inflexibility is 
due to the «syntactic disjunction» of the image in 
general: «if syntactic disjunction and articulation 
are not guaranteed, the system is dense. This is the 
case of an image» (Pouivet, [2010]: 94).
As for photography, the absence of a standard 
notation adds to the complexity of aesthetic eval-
uation of a «genuine» print of a photograph. For 
example, look at the images of Rennes Cathedral. 
The structure of these three images appears simi-
given character belong to the same compliance class and 
we can, theoretically, determine that each mark belongs 
to, and each object complies with inscriptions of, at most 
one particular character» (Goodman [1968]: 156).
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lar to us, while a few modifications of contrast and 
gradation during printing process display three 
aesthetically different manifestations of the same 
negative. Which could be the «genuine» print of 
this photograph? In the absence of a notational 
system it is theoretically impossible to identify it. 
Then we are faced with a multiplicity of images 
that are ontologically and hence aesthetically dif-
ferent. It could be the common point of photog-
raphy and etching, because the latter is realized 
«in a system without either syntactic or semantic 
differentiation» (Goodman [1968]: 192). Conse-
quently, without any notational system, the ontol-
ogy of photography moves away from the music.
Moreover, as Genette has shown (Genette, 
[1997]: 98), there is another no less important 
difference dealing with the result of the execu-
tion of a score and a drama, and printing a pho-
tograph: the first two cases proceed to an ephem-
eral event while the printing produces a perma-
nent object namely a photograph. We thus see the 
ontological specificity of photography, because it 
is on the one hand ontologically close to orches-
tral music but, at the same time, distinct from it. 
In this respect, photography is in the class of the 
literary work because the manuscript can instan-
tiate in multiple copies just as a photograph can 
be printed. But that’s not all, since all these copies, 
despite their differences in size, font, etc. have the 
same aesthetic value (Italo Calvino’s literary value 
of If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler (1979) remains 
identical in all its editions, since «identity of lan-
guage» and «syntactic identity» (Goodman [1968]: 
209) of all copies are guaranteed). On the con-
trary, the slightest change in the photograph’s base 
(paper, plastic, screen) or in the size of the print 
will modify its aesthetic properties, not to men-
tion all the possible modifications (contrast, tone, 
gradation, etc.) in the process of printing of the 
same negative, which are resulting from possible 
variations that occur in the optics and chemistry 
of the printing process. If it is true that artistically 
relevant variations are unavoidable in each artis-
tic performance, then «photographic works also 
admit of such variation, having correct instances 
(prints) that differ in such artistically relevant 
properties as tonal contrast, print medium, and 
size» (Davies [2012]: 270).
Suppose we find a negative of a famous pho-
tographer, say Ansel Adams (1902-1984), in his 
archive. Apparently, this negative has been aban-
doned by photographer for an unknown reason 
and we decide to print and present it as an artistic 
discovery. First, there is no information that can 
help us to achieve a print as Adams could print it. 
Second, possibly not all photographic materials of 
Adams’ day are available (paper, developer, fixer, 
etc.). Even if these materials are still available, the 
principal problem that the lab technician inevitably 
comes up against is how to print the Adams’ nega-
tive while not having access to prescriptions (the 
least they can be) in order to print a photograph as 
Adams intended it to look. Obviously, the printing 
process is not an insignificant act in the realization 
of a photographic work. For there are several tech-
nics that intervene and can modify the aesthetic 
values of a photograph, technics such as retouch-
ing, cropping, choice of paper, underexposure, 
overexposure, gradation, etc. Thus, what results 
from this print is only an adaptation inspired by 
Adams’ negative, and certainly not the work of the 
photographer. That’s why concerning photographic 
work we can introduce the notion of «co-creation» 
as creative-technical cooperation between the pho-
tographer and the lab technician. This co-creation 
in the work of Henri Cartier-Bresson (1908-2004) 
is more clearly manifested, because we know that 
he benefited the expertise of Pierre Gassmann 
(1913-2004) as his lab technician, who had a deci-
sive role in the accomplishment of the photogra-
pher’s works. The final photograph is the resultant 
of two different creative acts.
Nick Zangwill has similarly mooted a distinc-
tion which would be helpful here. According to 
him, in an artwork production there could be two 
agents involved: who has the «aesthetic insight» 
and who has the «aesthetic idea». Accordingly, 
the person with the aesthetic insight is not the 
same person as the person who had the aesthet-
ic idea. Here is Zangwill: «Artists might have an 
idea and then execute it themselves. Or they may 
leave much of the execution to someone else – 
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the studio assistant or factory worker. The studio 
assistant or factory worker may have the aesthetic 
idea, but it derived from someone else – the per-
son who had the insight. That person is the art-
ist» (Zangwill [2007]: 46). Correspondingly, the 
photographer as creator has the aesthetic insight 
by the fact that he is at the origin of the photo-
creation. However, the work of lab technician 
as producer is not less important than photogra-
pher creative act. For s/he is actually involved in 
the accomplishment process of the photographic 
work.
3. TECHNICAL REPRODUCIBILITY, FORGERY, 
AND PLAGIARISM
Is photography a reproducible art? If we mean 
by reproducibility obtaining aesthetically identi-
cal works, the answer will be negative. Although 
it is possible to print countless photographs based 
on one and the same negative, it is always prob-
able that none of these prints are identical to oth-
ers (the example of Rennes Cathedral’s images 
shows it well). In fact, the question of reproduc-
ibility involves volens nolens the problem of for-
gery. To solve this problem, Nelson Goodman has 
proposed a distinction between «autographic arts» 
and «allographic arts».
A work of art is autographic «if and only if the 
distinction between original and forgery of it is 
significant; or better, if and only if even the most 
exact duplication of it does not thereby count as 
genuine» (Goodman [1968]: 113). According to 
this definition, photography is not prima facie an 
autographic art, because it is at least theoretically 
possible to duplicate a photograph without any 
significant variation. Suppose a print machine that 
reproduces a negative in innumerable prints. In 
this case, photography reveals as an allographic 
art, due to the possibility of producing multiple 
images of the same negative, those which, given 
their similarity, have identical aesthetic properties. 
But it’s only the appearance of things.
First, photography, as a work of art, and as 
the result of technical expertise, requires often 
the intervention of the lab technician in order to 
improve the technical quality or to correct aesthet-
ic defects of the photographer – even if the pho-
tographer and the lab technician are the same per-
son. Thus, this technical intervention would pro-
duce different effects in each print and, therefore, 
the result could be a different photograph. Second, 
due to absence of a notational system, it is virtu-
ally impossible to reproduce identical photographs 
based on a single negative without any modifica-
tion among them. Imagine that a photographer 
makes two modified prints of the same negative 
one at the beginning of his career and the other 
during his stylistic maturity. Which one can be 
designated as «genuine» photograph? Not to men-
tion two print by two different lab technicians.
Or suppose one decides to reprint a negative 
of a deceased photographer because of, for exam-
ple, damages that have already been done to the 
so-called original photograph. It seems that (once 
again due to absence of a notational system) varia-
tions are inevitable. Do these variations make fake 
photograph? In order to designate the fake, a ref-
erence work is needed such a way that in relation 
to which other reproductions appear inauthentic. 
If such a reference has already been approved by 
the photographer, then there would be only one 
«genuine» photograph of a negative and, in this 
case, the photographic work would be autograph-
ic. Therefore, all other possible variations must be 
rejected as fake. In this case, the replacement of a 
damaged photograph by a new print of the same 
negative produces but a fake photograph.
The problem becomes more complicated when 
one decides, for example, to rephotograph a pho-
tograph that has lost its negative or when it is out 
of use because of damage. Will the result be a fake? 
Another case: scanning a photograph with a high 
resolution device produces another «photograph» 
or just a fake one? Apparently, as Ralls points out, 
photographs «can be identically copied, or faked, 
but are obviously not in a notation» (Ralls [1972]: 
16; author’s italic). Exploring Goodman theory of 
autographic/allographic distinction, Flint Schier 
proffers a case in which «it is instructive to con-
trast the question of the fakeable with the puzzle of 
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the plagiarisable. It seems that just as you cannot 
fake or forge Ulysses, so you cannot plagiarise the 
Mona Lisa [...] Plagiarising involves both copying 
someone else’s work and falsely claiming that the 
result is your own» (Schier [1986]: 29). It seems 
that photography could be both copied and pla-
giarised. Suppose that an amateur photographer 
finds the exact location of Cartier-Bresson’s Brie, 
France (1968) and takes a photo exactly the same 
as far as composition and visual configuration 
are concerned. Could he expose this photo as his 
own work? It’s a puzzling matter, since the photo is 
truly his own but he could falsly claim its original-
ity. His photography is thus a plagiarised one. So 
Schier point out that «it is interesting to note that 
the photographic image, which is mechanically 
produced in the first place, does not easily admit 
the notions of either forgery or plagiarism» (Schier 
[1986]: 30; my italics).
The puzzling question of photographic authen-
ticity eventually leads us to introduce a new onto-
logical category that includes both the possibility 
of the uniqueness and multiplicity of photographic 
works: photography is a multiple-instance auto-
graphic art that could be copied and plagiarised. 
Cast sculpture and etchings are certainly multiple-
instance autographic arts, but the significant dif-
ference is that they couldn’t be plagiarized. Since 
another instantiation of Rodin’s The Thinker is just 
a copy of it and one could not truly claim to be 
its creator. But, as it is mentioned, one could truly 
take a photo like André Kertész’s The Fork (1928) 
or even Ansel Adams’ Moon and Half Dome 
(1960) without being condemned to forgery. The-
ses cases break out the borders between original 
and copy, authenticity and forgery: a photography 
then could be original (taken by photographer) 
and, at the same time, plagiarised (taken following 
another (known) photography).
A topic that winds through discussion is to 
compare the photographic art with Jorge Luis 
Borges’ ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the Quix-
ote’ (1939) in which Menard has the ambition to 
write Don Quixote as an original literary work 
and not as a mere copy of it. It is tempting to see 
how Menard’s ambition could be compared with 
aforementioned photographer who strive scrupu-
lously to take the same photograph as, say, Ansel 
Adams’ Moon and Half Dome having in mind to 
«create» exactly an identical photograph as to rep-
resent the same visual and compositional proper-
ties. There are several issues at stake. Firstly, if this 
photographer achieves a photograph identical to 
Adams’, should it be object of the same aesthetic 
appreciation? Formally, there are not any differ-
ences between two photographs and it could rea-
sonably be appreciated as Adams’ work. Of course, 
it is counterintuitive, since originality is one of the 
principal criteria of aesthetic appreciation, for see-
ing the original object allows «a live causal con-
nection with genius» (Lamarque [2010]: 75). The 
role of originality either in artistic creation or in 
aesthetic appreciation is obviously a matter of dis-
pute and I don’t intend to develop it here. What I 
am seeking for is the manner to identify the origi-
nality of photography as an art work. I will thus 
rely on the Levinson’s notion of «contextualism» 
– which has been taken by granted in Lamarque’s 
Work and Object (2010) though in a subtly differ-
ent manner. According to Levinson
contextualism is the thesis that a work of art is an 
artefact of a particular sort, an object or structure 
that is the product of human invention at a particu-
lar time and place, by a particular individual or indi-
viduals, and that that fact has consequences for how 
one properly experiences, understands, and evalu-
ates works of art. For contextualism, artworks are 
essentially historically embedded objects, ones that 
have neither art status, nor determinate identity, nor 
clear aesthetic properties, nor definite aesthetic mean-
ings, outside or apart from the generative contexts in 
which they arise and in which they are put forward. 
(Levinson [2016]: 20; my italics)
The context in which a work of art is produced 
is then integrally tied up with its very identity. 
Nevertheless, according to formalism, the photo-
graph taken by an amateur having the same visual 
configuration as of Adams’ work must likewise be 
aesthetically appreciated without paying any con-
siderable attention to the fact that Adams’ work 
is historically prior to the amateur (or any oth-
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er) photographer. But «if contextualism is right, 
objects that share the same manifest form may in 
fact not have the same status, content, or value 
as artworks» (Levinson [2016]: 21). We can draw 
out such a consequence from this first moment of 
debate that it is obviously not appropriate to aes-
thetically appreciate these two photographs even 
though they have exactly the same visual configu-
ration. Since the historic-photographic context in 
which Adams’ work takes place must be consid-
ered as a decisive factor in our aesthetic evalua-
tion. This «ontological contextualism», as Davies 
calls it, «acknowledges the socio-historical embed-
dedness of some of the features making up the 
work» (Davies [2003]: 34).
But we are encountered with photographs cir-
culating for example on the Web whose photogra-
pher and their creative contexts remain unknown 
to us. Can we aesthetically appreciate such photos 
without referring to their context? It seems plau-
sible to think of such photos as valuable as far as 
their mere visual configuration is considered. But 
are they to be considered as photographic works? 
In this moment, I will proffer an explanation of 
which the salient feature is Lamarque’s inspir-
ing distinction between «object» and «work». He 
maintains that «a work is a cultural entity whose 
existence depends essentially on appropriate cul-
tural conditions» (Lamarque [2010]: 4). He adds: 
«Works are a species of cultural objects whose 
very existence rests on essential possession of 
fairly complex intentional and relational proper-
ties» (Lamarque [2010]: 56). A work is of course 
an object due to its material structure but, as 
Lamarque indicates, it is object of a «distinct kind, 
cultural or institutional» (Lamarque [2010]: 4). 
Following this explanation, we are to make a mul-




As Ansel Adams puts it remarkably in his Per-
sonal Credo (1943) «a photograph is not an acci-
dent – it is a concept». The conception is thus the 
main criteria to designate a photograph-qua-work. 
This conception is that which occurs in a cultural 
and historical context. Therefor «the character of 
a work, its salient features, its value, broadly con-
ceived, indeed its very identity as a work, will be 
bound up, to a greater or lesser degree, with the 
historical and cultural context of its creation» 
(Lamarque [2010]: 67). Seeing a photo without 
knowing its provenance in an undetermined his-
torical context is just seeing photograph-qua-
picture. Since «the provenance of the object in 
front of me is crucial in determining what work 
I am giving my attention» (Lamarque [2010]: 85) 
and, consequently, its provenance «is all impor-
tant in constituting the full aesthetic apprecia-
tion» (Lamarque [2010]: 87). Today, due to smart 
phones, every body can take photographs of such 
and such event. But the result will stop at the sec-
ond layer i.e. photograph-qua-picture. For a pic-
ture becomes a photographic work, it must meet 
several conditions of which the acceptance by 
«artworld», that is, to be placed in a relevant con-
text, is determinant.
4. NEGATIVE FILM-POSITIVE PRINT 
ONTOLOGICAL RELATION
Let’s go back to the question we asked at the 
beginning: what sort of thing is a photograph? In 
order to answer, we must go through the debates 
concerning the ontological status of the work of art 
in general and the photographic work in particular 
(for an enlightening survey see Livingston [2016]). 
The relationship between the negative and the 
photograph proves to be puzzling because, as we 
have just seen, we can not explain it by taking into 
account the ontology of music, literature, or the 
visual arts. Actually, photography has some com-
mon ontological traits with these arts, but the dif-
ferences are also obvious. To begin, we must study 
the proposed theories for the ontology of art and 
consider their possible relevance to photography.
A) Singular/multiple
Although photography looks prima facie a 
multiple art like drama, music, and etching, there 
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are some kinds of photography that are singular of 
which the perfect examples are Polaroid and pho-
togram. Additionally, it is logically possible that 
a photographer decides to print only one photo-
graph of a given negative, or in the cases where 
all the prints of a negative have been vanished 
or completely damaged except one. Photography 
thus isn’t sensu stricto a multiple art. Nevertheless, 
to the extent that the negative is at the origin of 
several prints, photography must be classified as 
a multiple art. As we see, it’s a matter of dispute 
to decide whether photography is a singular or 
multiple art. In another proposition, Wolterstorff 
distinguishes «performance-work» from «object-
work» and claims that in one hand, «most if not 
all performance-works are universals4, in that they 
can be multiply performed» and, in the other, 
«any one of the several objects of an object-work 
can be destroyed without the object-work there-
by being destroyed» (Wolterstorff [1975]: 118). 
According to this explanation, the negative/print 
pair could be regarded as «object-work» because 
the existence of the prints is independent of the 
negative and the destruction of one do not require 
losing of the other. But concerning photogra-
phy, the problem is that we can not designate the 
best print of a negative as, for example, we do it 
reasonably for a musical performance. There are 
standards that determine the correctness of such 
performances and, therefore, Wolterstorff main-
tains that works such as printmaking, cast sculp-
tures, repeatable works of architecture are «norm-
kinds», that is «kinds determined by the proper-
ties normative within them, where the properties 
normative within them are precisely those select-
ed, for example by the composer as required for 
4 I won’t discuss here the nature of universal/particular 
distinction as it is applied to the ontology of art. For, con-
cerning photography, this distinction is highly problem-
atic because neither negative film nor printed photograph 
could be classified as universal, for the fact that both 
are physical entities. As Margolis have pointed out «a 
work of art, then, is a particular. It cannot be a universal 
because it is created and can be destroyed; also, because 
it possesses physical and perceptual properties» (Margolis 
[1977]: 48).
the correctness of a performance» (Thomasson 
[2004]: 83). And this is also the case for «object-
work». That’s why Wolterstorff adds that «object-
works are norm-kinds, and being such they have 
associated with them certain requirements for 
something’s being a correct example of the work» 
(Wolterstorff [1975]: 118). A negative film could 
not function as norm for its printed photograph, 
for one can print a photograph in variety of inde-
terminate ways. On the contrary, performing a 
score or staging a drama requires a framework 
which often accompanies the work itself. In pho-
tography, it is practically difficult to specify the 
requirements in order to achieve «a correct exam-
ple of the work», i.e. a printed photograph exactly 
created according to certain norms determined 
by photographer. Negative, then, could not be a 
norm-kinde. We need say more.
B) Norm kind/instance 
What is common between a «performance-
work» and an «object-work» is the way of their 
performances: to play notes or to perform roles, 
to execute etching’s prints are done according to 
certain prescriptions of composer, author, or artist. 
But what are the norms and standards of print-
ing a photograph? In the absence of a notational 
system, the printing process remains indetermi-
nate. Suppose there are several prints with vari-
able properties of the same negative in a photog-
rapher’s archive. How can one identify the most 
«exact» print of the negative? If all photographs 
are in one way or another deficiently printed, can 
we conclude that the photograph of this particu-
lar negative does not exist? If we find an unpub-
lished score in the archive of a composer, it has 
no ontological differences compared to those 
that are known and even approved by the com-
poser himself. While an unprinted negative does 
not have the same ontological properties as the 
printed photographs made by the photographer 
or approved by him. It seems that Wolterstorff ’s 
proposal to consider object-work as «norm-kinds» 
does not apply to photography.
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C) Structural type/physical object
There is another way to explain the type and 
its instantiations by distinguishing the «structural 
types» from «physical objects». An etching is a 
structural type that could be at the origin of sev-
eral prints. The essential thing is the instantiation 
of etching’s basic structure in these prints. But as 
for the relation between negative and printed pho-
tograph, this structure can radically be modified. 
Because it is always possible to eliminate a signifi-
cant part of the negative during printing so much 
that the result shows only one of its constituent 
visual elements. In this case can we say that the 
«structure» of the negative has been instantiated 
in the printed photograph? Or it’s about restruc-
turing the photograph? Analogously, if a direc-
tor decides to simply remove act two and four of 
Hamlet, is it still an instantiation of this drama? 
It is difficult to consider such a restructuring (or 
destructuring?) as an instantiation of Hamlet5. 
Therefore, the «structuralist» solution does not 
clarify the ontology of the photographic image.
D) Type/token
In order to explain the nature of multiple 
works, Richard Wollheim proposes a model of 
Peircean origin based on types and tokens dis-
tinction (Wollheim [1980]: 49). Here also the 
proposal fails when it comes to photography. For 
«types and kinds, traditionally understood, exist 
eternally, independently from all human activi-
ties; thus, contra traditional beliefs and practices 
regarding the arts, works of art on such models 
cannot genuinely be created by artists at all, but 
only selected from the range of available types 
or kinds» (Thomasson [2004]: 83). It is therefore 
counterintuitive to consider the negative as a type 
or as a kind, since it exists as a real object while 
having concrete properties6. Perhaps this distinc-
5 From another perspective Jerrold Levinson also refuted 
the thesis that the musical work is a «sound structure» 
(Levinson [2011]: 63-78).
6 The existence of types is epistemologically problematic 
too. For the types dos not sustain in a causal relation with 
tion explains the ontological nature of the score 
but certainly fails as to the relationship between 
negative and printed photograph7. Negatives are 
real entities that can be replicate, whereas types are 
abstract entities instantiated by concrete individu-
als. Again, as far as causal relation between nega-
tive and printed photograph is concerned, it seems 
irrelevant to consider negative as a type, for types 
are generally taken as «abstract objects that do not 
have determinate spatial locations. It is therefore 
questionable whether they can enter into causal 
relationships with things that do» (Davies [2012]: 
267). Moreover, as Brennan puts it reasonably, «to 
talk of two tokens being of the same type, after all, 
is simply to indicate some relationship between 
them, rather than to make the ontologically bold 
claim that some further thing exists which they 
both instantiate» (Brennan [1988]: 74). To put it 
otherwise, two or more photographs could have 
the same properties as their original negatives; but 
it does not mean that they possess the same onto-
logical status of the negative. Since, for example, 
the colours or light and dark zones on the nega-
tive are not the same as they are embodied on the 
paper of a positive picture. It is just the case for 
digital photographs too, since raw file is a collec-
tion of bitmaps while the printed photograph is an 
analog entity having concrete and palpable prop-
erties like visual forms and colours. Let’s take a 
look to the nature of type-token relation. Brennan 
proposes three sufficient conditions as to explain 
who x to be a token of the same type as y: «First, 
x must possess a structure that is highly similar 
to y’s. Second, x is materially similar to y. And, 
us and since all human knowledge necessitates such a 
relation, then types are out of the borders of our knowl-
edge (Wetzel [2009]: 23).
7 To overcome the problematic relation between type and 
token in art, Joseph Margolis proposes a «reversal» model 
according to which artists make primarily the token of 
the type that they have created, since «to credit an art-
ist with having created a new type of art – a particular 
art-type – we must (normally) be thus crediting him in 
virtue of the particular (token) work he has made», and 
he adds «the type does not exist except instantiated in its 
proper tokens» (Margolis [1977]: 46).
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thirdly, it is possible to obtain one of them using 
a process in which the other has a suitable causal 
role to play» (Brennan [1988]: 77; author’s italics). 
Even though the negative-print relation satisfies 
the first and third conditions, the second one, as 
we have seen, remains unsatisfied. Not to men-
tion the cases in which the printed photograph 
does even not meet the first condition, because 
not being «highly similar» to the negative due to 
several modifications which occur during print-
ing process. How then explain the relationship 
between the negative and the printed photograph?
As far as we can see, all proposed explanations 
regarding the ontological status of art works fail 
when the negative film/printed photograph is con-
cerned. I will then propose an alternative account 
relying on Genette distinction between «imma-
nence» and «transcendence» to overcome the 
problems and theoretical dead ends as encoun-
tered in the field of negative film/printed photo 
ontological relations. Here we will consider the 
negative film as immanence and the printed pho-
tograph as transcendence or manifestation of the 
former. It seems that Genette’s proposition avoids 
us from the problem of abstract entities and it 
could adequately be applied to negative film/print-
ed photograph ontological relation.
5. IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE
One of the first questions that arise in ontol-
ogy of art is whether a work of art is an abstract 
or concrete entity. A work is abstract if it has this 
peculiarity of being reproduced in several copies 
without losing its authenticity. For example, the 
Piano Concerto No. 22 of Mozart is an abstract 
entity for this reason that it is possible to play it 
many times in several places. In any case, the 
work of Mozart, namely the score, is a repeatable 
work while it is unique in its ontological imma-
nence. On the contrary, a work is concrete when 
it can not be instantiated in several instances. Van 
Gogh’s The Starry Night (1889) is thus a concrete 
work because it is not repeatable or instantiable: 
it is a unique work hanged on MoMA and all the 
other paintings that look like it are either fake or 
copies aesthetically inferior to it. Accordingly, if 
the negative is considered as an abstract entity, it 
could be instantiated several times. This claim, as 
we have seen before, bears certain problems: the 
problem deals with the fact that the identity of the 
so-called original work (negative as abstract enti-
ty) differs from concretely instantiated examples 
(concrete entity or printed photograph).
In his The Work of Art: Immanence and Tran-
scendence (1997) Gérard Genette (1930-2018) 
proposes a distinction between ontological imma-
nence and transcendence of artworks which elu-
cidates, and refines Goodman’s basic distinction 
between autographic and allographic arts. Accord-
ing to Genette, the allographic work has two 
modes of existence: ideal immanence and physi-
cal manifestation. The properties of immanence 
are constitutive of the object whereas the proper-
ties of the manifestation are of contingent nature 
but, at the same time, possess its constituent char-
acters: «the object of manifestation exhibits both 
the constitutive and contingent properties, while 
the object of immanence exhibits only the former» 
(Genette [1997]: 91). For example, Dino Buzzati’s 
The Tartar Steppe (1940) as an object of imma-
nence has certain constitutive features (characters, 
a certain plot, stylistic qualities, etc.). All copies of 
this novel in all languages are the physical mani-
festations of the original manuscript written by 
Buzzati. Contingency consists of all the differences 
of these copies: the number of pages, the typog-
raphy, etc. Yet, in spite of all these differences, the 
immanent object remains the same, i.e. the novel 
created by the Italian author. Can we apply this 
ontological explanation to photography? Of the 
seven examples cited by Genette (music, choreog-
raphy, architecture, culinary work, stage produc-
tion and fashion design) the photography is curi-
ously absent (Genette [1997]: 93). However, this 
allows us to apply this distinction as follows:
Immanence                                                           Photographic work 
 
 
Manifestation                                        negative film                            positive prints  
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The photographic work in its immanence is 
unique (for example, the negative of Cartier-Bres-
son’s Behind the Gare Saint-Lazare (1932) as it is 
exposed by the photographer at a certain time and 
place). The physical manifestation of this photo-
graph is nevertheless multiple, because there are 
innumerable positive prints of it including all its 
digital manifestations on the Internet or on the 
other possible vehicles. Let us consider the ontol-
ogy of photography in this perspective. On the 
one hand, photography prima facie is a technic 
for capturing the effects of light on a photosensi-
tive surface (light, X-rays, infrared, etc.) which 
results in an exposed, negative film. On the other 
hand, the negative is traditionally printed in one 
or more examples. Here we are dealing with the 
specificity of photography: it is a two-step process. 
For there is a negative film as immanence that is 
not yet a photograph as such, and a photograph as 
transcendence that can only be manifested through 
the prior existence of a negative. In this regard, the 
printed photograph is transcendence, because its 
history of production or reception goes beyond of 
the immanent ontological limits of negative film. 
As Genette puts it: «transcendence is a second-
ary and derivative mode, a complementary, and, 
on occasion, compensatory supplement to imma-
nence» (Genette [1997]: 161).
6. CONCLUSION
In the case of painting, for example, the work 
is formed by the direct intervention of the creative 
act of the painter. Photography can be realised by 
the work of one or more persons. The aesthetic 
experience of a yellowed, pale, and depressed 
photograph is certainly not similar to the same 
photograph when freshly taken out of the labo-
ratory. The question is whether it is artistically 
(even aesthetically) legitimate – in the possible 
case – to reprint the negative in order to access 
a new photograph. This question is dealing with 
the fact that photograph is a two-stage art: pho-
tographing and printing. This peculiarity differs 
ontology of photography from other art forms. 
Its ontology is, in some respects, comparable 
with music, literature, and drama, and in some 
other respects similar to painting and etching 
(see above table). Thus, photography has «multi-
ple ontology». Photography could be at the same 
time autographic and allographic, fakeable and 
Ontological Status of Works of Art
Music Score Interpretation Multiple Repeatable Allographic Unfakeable
Literary work Manuscript Publishing Multiple Repeatable Allographic Unfakeable
Etching Plate Printing Multiple Repeatable Allographic Fakeable
Painting Canvas - Singular Unrepeatable Autographic Fakeable
Sculpture Statue - Singular Unrepeatable Autographic Fakeable






 Photography by author (Rennes Cathedral, France, 2013)
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unfakeable, singular and multiple. Relying on 
Genette’s ideas, I proposed to consider negative 
film as immanence and the printed photograph 
as transcendence or manifestation of the former. 
The advantage of considering printed photograph 
as transcendence is that the visual structure of 
the work could be changed over time, accord-
ing to interpretations of photographer himself or 
his lab technician. it means that different print-
ed photographs could be emanate from a single 
negative film, each of them manifesting proper 
aesthetic properties which could not be found as 
such in the negative film considered as the imma-
nent work. It seems not unreasonable to propose 
a reassessment of current ontological categories 
in order to conceive the mode of existence of a 
photographic image. Since the existence of nega-
tive does not guarantee the existence of photo-
graph-qua-work, it is then essential to consider a 
photographic work in its historical context. Pho-
tographs are then context-dependent, i.e. cultur-
ally and historically determined spatial-temporal 
entities. Finally, the explanation that I propose 
is that each (analog) photograph is ontologically 
dependent upon a negative as immanence, that 
could be manifested in multiple spatial-temporal 
particulars (prints) having certain or all of its 
properties. Photographs as negative are singular, 
autographic objects (created in a definite histori-
cal – artistic context) while as printed are indefi-
nite multiple, allographic objects due to their 
printing process undertaken by lab technician or 
other than photographer himself. Regarding the 
absence of a notational system in photograph, 
each print could be an adaptation of the negative.
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